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I 
INTRODUCTION 
What makes a great cause lawyer?1 Is it dedication to the cause?2 Strong ties 
to a political movement?3 Or can someone with superb legal skills but no 
political commitment be just as effective at advocating for a cause as a more 
conventional cause lawyer, employed full-time on behalf of the cause? A 
significant body of scholarship has explored these questions with mixed results.4 
Perhaps not surprisingly, dedication, strong political ties, and superb legal skills 
all play a role in the making of a great cause lawyer, but so does a somewhat 
less obvious quality, which Marc Galanter described several years ago as 
practice “style.”5 
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 1. Cause lawyers are activist lawyers who use their legal skills to advance a cause. See STUART A. 
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 170–
99 (1st ed. 1974) (providing an analysis of activist lawyers that would become the foundation of the 
“cause lawyering” literature); Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the 
Reproduction of Professional Authority: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL 
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 3, 4 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 
1998) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, Cause Lawyering] (“Cause lawyering . . . is frequently directed 
at altering some aspect of the social, economic, and political status quo.”); Austin Sarat & Stuart 
Scheingold, State Transformation, Globalization, and the Possibilities of Cause Lawyering: An 
Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATES IN A GLOBAL ERA 3, 13 (Austin Sarat & Stuart 
Scheingold eds., 2001) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, State Transformation] (noting that cause 
lawyers are those who “deploy their legal skills to challenge prevailing distributions of political, social, 
economic, [or] legal values and resources.”). A cause lawyer is also generally a lawyer who elevates 
cause over client, although sometimes the cause is the client herself. See generally Stuart Scheingold & 
Anne Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering: Practice Sites and the Politicization of the Professional, 5 
INT’L J. LEGAL PROFESSION 209 (1998) [hereinafter Scheingold & Bloom, Transgressive Cause 
Lawyering] (describing a continuum of cause lawyers, including those for whom client empowerment is 
the “cause”). 
 2. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Towards an Understanding of the 
Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL 
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 31, 32 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 
1998). 
 3. MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF 
LEGAL MOBILIZATION 61 (1994) (describing cause lawyer Winn Newman’s strong ties to the equal-pay 
movement as critical to the movement’s success). 
 4. See, e.g., Sarat & Scheingold, Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 4 (examining the conditions 
that lead lawyers to engage in cause lawyering); Sarat & Scheingold, State Transformation, supra note 1, 
at 13 (observing that in practice, cause lawyering overlaps with conventional lawyering). 
 5. Marc Galanter, Mega-Law: An American Invention, 3 HUMAN. 16, 16 (1982) [hereinafter 
Galanter, Mega-Law]; Marc Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering in the Contemporary United 
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An attorney’s practice style has to do with how she approaches legal 
problems. Does she research the issue intensively before offering the client a 
potential solution?6 Does she rely on specialists to understand issues with which 
she is unfamiliar?7 Or does she adopt a less legalistic approach to the problem, 
essentially doing the best she can under the circumstances, with relatively little 
legal research or outside consultation?8 Galanter dubbed the former, more 
research-intensive style of legal practice “mega-lawyering.”9 Lawyers who are 
less legalistic, on the other hand—who, in Galanter’s words, undertake “more 
perfunctory investigation[s]” and engage in “a fair amount of ‘winging it,’”—
were described as “ordinary” lawyers, employing an “ordinary” practice style.10 
In the early 1980s, when Galanter first set out these distinctions, differences 
among lawyers and the ways they practice law was understood primarily in 
terms of differences in the types of clients different lawyers represent.11 Lawyers 
in the upper stratosphere of legal practice represented corporate clients, while 
lawyers in the lower stratosphere represented individuals.12 Then, as now, cause 
lawyers did not fit easily into this division. This is because, as attorneys who 
focus primarily on the “cause,” they challenge the dominant “ideology of 
advocacy,” which trains lawyers to focus on their clients’ interests, while 
remaining neutral to the cause.13 
Because they tend to represent individual clients, cause lawyers seem to 
have more in common with those operating in the lower sphere of legal 
practice. Like those representing individual clients, for example, cause lawyers 
tend to work with smaller budgets and offer a relatively narrow range of 
services.14 But cause lawyers also have much in common with those representing 
corporate clients. Like corporate lawyering, cause lawyering is associated with 
States, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS: LAWYERS, DOCTORS AND OTHERS 152, 153 (Robert 
Dingwall & Philip Lewis eds., 1983) [hereinafter Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering]. 
 6. See id. at 154 (describing the operating style of mega-lawyering as involving “more elaborate” 
research and “painstaking” investigation, as compared to that of “ordinary lawyering,” which is typified 
by “less elaborate” research and “more perfunctory” investigation). 
 7. See id. at 155 (describing the “high degree of specialisation” that is “cultivated” in mega-
lawyering firms) and at 157 (noting that mega-lawyering usually involves “generous use of experts”).  
 8. See infra text accompanying note 10. 
 9. Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 157. 
 10. Id. (citations omitted). 
 11. See id. at 152 (noting that most scholarship “conclude[s] that much of the variation within the 
profession is accounted for by ‘one fundamental difference . . . the difference between lawyers who 
represent large organizations [and] . . . those who represent individuals or individuals’ small 
businesses.’”) (citations omitted); see also John P. Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyers’ 
Work: Chicago in 1975 and 1995, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 751, 770–74 (1998) (describing two distinct 
“hemispheres” of lawyers representing corporate and individual clients). 
 12. Galanter, Mega-Law, supra note 5, at 16. 
 13. See Scheingold & Bloom, supra note 1, at 209 (noting that cause lawyers “challenge 
mainstream representations of professionalism” by “taking sides in social conflicts”); William Simon, 
The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 36 
(describing the neutrality principle as one of the bedrocks of the “ideology of advocacy”). 
 14. Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 154. 
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relatively high levels of prestige.15 Moreover, much like corporate lawyers, cause 
lawyers essentially have a “repeat player”—the cause—for a client, with the 
corresponding advantages of the “repeat player” status.16 
Galanter’s emphasis on the importance of practice style helps us better 
understand some important similarities between the professional experiences of 
cause lawyers and corporate lawyers, even when they represent very different 
types of clients. But Galanter’s fundamental point was much more profound. 
More focus on practice style, he argued, would shed light on how changes in 
practice style were marking an important “shift” in American legal practice, 
with implications not only for lawyers and their clients, but also for the “larger 
economic and political order.”17 
Although Galanter acknowledged, at that time, that mega-lawyering was 
associated primarily with lawyers in corporate practice, he argued convincingly 
that the mega-lawyering style was being adopted by many practicing outside the 
realm of the corporate law firm.18 Perhaps more important, the mega-lawyering 
style was also gaining cultural dominance within the profession as a particularly 
prestigious (and lucrative) style of practice.19 In his words, mega-lawyering was 
becoming “an increasingly visible and influential part of the whole.” 20 
Some twenty-five years later, Galanter’s insights seem remarkably prescient. 
Mega-lawyering now describes the practice style of large segments of the bar, 
including many cause lawyers.21 Moreover, there is now a significant literature 
on the economic, social, and political forces behind this fundamental shift in 
 15. This greater prestige stems from the role that cause lawyering is perceived to play in providing 
legitimacy for the legal system and for the profession as a whole by representing interests that might 
otherwise go unrepresented. See, e.g., David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the Law: 
Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 407, 459 (1994) (discussing the public-interest lawyer). As Sarat and Scheingold have 
noted, the legal profession “need[s] lawyers who commit themselves and their legal skills to furthering 
a vision of the good society because this ‘moral activism’ puts a human face on lawyering.” Sarat & 
Scheingold, Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 3. In exchange for this service, legal elites tend to view 
the cause lawyer in a more favorable light than they view other lawyers who practice outside the upper 
hemisphere. 
 16. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 140–44 (1974). 
 17. Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 153. This “shift,” Galanter argued, 
was “comparable to the movement from the individual general practitioner to hospital medicine.” Id. 
 18. See id. at 154–55, 170 (discussing the expansion of mega-lawyering outside the corporate firm), 
at 167–68 (describing the adoption of a mega-lawyering style by corporate in-house counsel, religious 
cults, the Defender Association of Philadelphia, and Team Defense, Inc., a nonprofit representing poor 
defendants). 
 19. See id. at 158 (noting the greater prestige associated with mega-lawyering). 
 20. Id. at 172. 
 21. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of 
Times: The Precarious Nature of Plaintiffs’ Practice in Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1785–95 (2002) 
(describing the rise of “heavy hitters” (mega-lawyers) in the plaintiff’s bar and distinguishing them 
from those with a more ordinary or “bread and butter” practice); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING 
REFORM SERIOUSLY 170 (1986) (describing the increasingly elite focus of the public-interest (or cause-
lawyering) bar). 
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legal practice.22 Relatively less attention, however, has been paid to 
understanding the political implications of this development. And, yet, 
according to Galanter, it is the political implications of mega-lawyering that 
should concern us most. 
Galanter has not (yet) written all that much on the implications of the rise of 
mega-lawyering. As of this writing, there are only two articles, totaling under 
thirty pages.23 The focus of these articles is to describe mega-lawyering as an 
innovation in legal practice. But both articles also close with a dark conclusion: 
“Mega-law heightens our expectations of legal vindication,” even as it “teaches 
us to despair of their realization.”24 
Legal vindication is the coin of the realm for all lawyers, of course, but it is 
especially so for cause lawyers, who play a uniquely important role in shoring 
up the legitimacy of the legal system.25 If mega-lawyering “teaches us to 
despair” of legal vindication, does this mean cause lawyers who adopt a mega-
lawyering style are less effective politically? It is not a question Galanter has 
explored. But Galanter’s articles on mega-lawyering do provide important 
conceptual tools that may be used to evaluate how practice style affects the 
efficacy of cause lawyers. 
What follows is both a fuller explication of those tools and a more grounded 
exploration of how differences in practice style affected the outcomes in two 
cases. Part II provides some background on why the practice styles of cause 
lawyers may matter for purposes of successful legal mobilization. Part III 
analyzes how the practice styles of cause lawyers in two strikingly similar cases 
may have been a factor in the very different outcomes that the cases achieved. 
Part IV speculates about how practice style may affect the possibilities for 
successful legal mobilization more broadly. 
 22. Virtually all of this literature focuses on the plaintiff’s bar. See, e.g., Daniels & Martin, supra 
note 21, at 1795–1808 (describing changes in the market and legal environments for Texas plaintiffs’ 
lawyers); Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary Cases to Litigators of Extraordinary Cases: 
Stratification in the Plaintiff’s Bar in the 21st Century, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 219, 228 (1997) (noting the 
“growth of bureaucratic structures” in the plaintiff’s bar), at 231 (noting the large size, geographical 
reach, and “extensive resources” at the “top” of the plaintiff’s bar); Jerry Van Hoy, Markets and 
Contingency: How Client Markets Influence the Work of Plaintiff’s Personal Injury Lawyers, 6 INT’L J. 
LEGAL PROF. 345, 345–46 (1999) (similar findings in Indiana); cf. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN 
LAWYERS 44–47 (1989) (examining the rise of professionalism, a related development). 
 23. Galanter, Mega-Law, supra note 5 (two pages); Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, 
supra note 5 (twenty-one pages). Galanter has also written related articles about the growth of large 
law firms. See, e.g., Marc S. Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion-to-
Partner Tournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L. REV. 747 (1990). 
 24. Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 173; Galanter, Mega-Law, supra 
note 5, at 16. 
 25. Sarat & Scheingold, Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 3 (contending that cause lawyers take 
responsibility for the positions they represent and thus “elevate[] the moral posture of the legal 
profession beyond a crude instrumentalism in which lawyers sell their services without regard to the 
ends to which those services are put”). 
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II 
CAUSE LAWYERING AND PRACTICE STYLE 
Cause lawyers are activist lawyers who use their legal skills to advance a 
cause.26 Although the prototypical cause lawyer works for organizations like the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) or the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP),27 a great deal of cause lawyering is 
also engaged in by lawyers in private practice.28 Moreover, in practice, 
“[i]ndividual lawyers frequently cross and recross the lines between cause and 
conventional legal practice.”29 In other words, lawyers sometimes act as cause 
lawyers in a particular case, only to return to more conventional representation 
in a different case. 
Cause lawyers often engage in as much activism as lawyering.30 Indeed, their 
success often depends on their ability to subordinate legal strategies to the 
broader aims of the political movement.31 Thus, the most effective cause lawyers 
spend some energy coordinating litigation with publicity campaigns so that the 
litigation can act as a tool for raising consciousness.32 Cause lawyers can also 
encourage more direct activism, such as “rallies, marches, and other efforts” 
aimed at displaying support for the broader cause.33 
Although cause lawyers share an interest in using the law as a tool for social 
change, cause lawyering is not associated with a particular practice style. In 
part, this is because cause lawyers are found in all kinds of practice settings.34 
When cause lawyers work for nonprofit organizations like the ACLU and the 
NAACP, their style of practice tends to more closely resemble the mega-
lawyering style of lawyers in corporate practice. Perhaps because of this, 
Galanter describes the legal style of cause lawyers as “an approximation of 
mega-law[yering] with less ample funding.”35 When cause lawyering is engaged 
 26. See discussion supra note 1. 
 27. See SCHEINGOLD, supra note 1, at 173. 
 28. See Scheingold & Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 210 (describing a 
study of cause lawyering in different practice settings, including private practice); Sarat & Scheingold, 
Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 17 (discussing cause lawyers in private practice). 
 29. Sarat & Scheingold, State Transformation, supra note 1, at 13. 
 30. See, e.g., MCCANN, supra note 3, at 61 (recounting a cause lawyer’s efforts to educate the 
public about the cause for which he was litigating); see also Scheingold & Bloom, Transgressive Cause 
Lawyering, supra note 1, at 236 (describing the activism of a union lawyer). 
 31. See SCHEINGOLD, supra note 1, at 203–19 (arguing that legal tactics must be subordinate to a 
broader strategy of political mobilization to succeed). 
 32. See, e.g., MCCANN, supra note 3, at 58–63 (discussing the impact of media coverage on legal 
mobilization in the equal-pay movement). 
 33. See id. at 81. 
 34. See Scheingold & Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 210 (noting that 
cause lawyering takes place in corporate, salaried, and small-firm practices). 
 35. Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 171. 
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in by smaller-firm lawyers who represent individual clients, however, their 
practice style may more closely resemble that of “ordinary” lawyers.36 
There is also some evidence that lawyers in different practices approach 
their cause-lawyering activities differently. Corporate lawyers, for example, are 
less likely to engage in political activities such as organizing protests or publicity 
campaigns around the broader issues at stake.37 In contrast, small-firm lawyers 
who routinely represent individual clients tend to exhibit greater willingness to 
engage in overtly political tactics.38 Because of this, some studies suggest that 
the type of client a lawyer usually represents (corporate versus individual) 
reveals much about how the lawyer will approach her cause-lawyering 
activities.39 
Galanter suggests, however, that differences in how lawyers approach cause 
lawyering may have less to do with the type of client a lawyer normally 
represents and more with practice style. This is because even those lawyers who 
do not engage in cause lawyering full-time are likely to use the same practice 
style in cause lawyering as they do in their everyday legal activities. In other 
words, while lawyers move in and out of cause-lawyering activities,40 it is 
unlikely that they change practice styles when doing so. A lawyer who employs 
a mega-lawyering practice style is likely to operate as a mega-lawyer in all cases, 
regardless of the type of client she represents. 
The growing dominance of mega-lawyering, however, poses its own set of 
challenges to cause lawyering. This is because the increasing visibility and 
influence of mega-lawyering, both within and without the cause-lawyering 
enterprise, may undermine our faith in the legitimacy of the legal system.41 As 
Galanter has documented extensively, criticism of lawyers—and of the legal 
system—has been growing in the last few decades.42 Galanter traced these 
increasingly negative perceptions of the legal profession directly to the growth 
of mega-lawyering.43 
 36. See Scheingold & Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 229–44 (describing 
the challenges associated with cause lawyering in salaried and small-firm practice settings, in terms 
characteristic of an “ordinary” practice style). 
 37. See id. at 220–29, 245 (observing that pressure on billable hours and conflict-of-interest rules 
impose some restrictions on corporate lawyers’ ability to engage in cause lawyering). 
 38. See id. at 236–44 (observing that small-firm lawyers tend to be described as political activists). 
 39. See Scheingold & Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 210 (describing the 
study’s conclusion that “professionally transgressive”—overtly political lawyering—“can be traced 
to . . . the conditions at the [corporate, salaried, or small firm] practice site”). 
 40. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
 41. See Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 173 (associating mega-
lawyering with “disenchantment” and perceptions that the legal system is “manipulable and political”). 
 42. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes, 
and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 814–15 (1998) (noting that lawyers are no longer 
portrayed in fiction and on television as “unalloyed hero[es]” but instead occupy a “morally ambiguous 
and precarious role”). 
 43. See Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 173 (arguing that mega-
lawyering has been stereotyped and that mega-law is “intimately connected with a dual movement of 
legislation and disenchantment”). 
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The world of mega-lawyering is a world of “bargaining, deals and 
settlements,” where law is both “omnipresent” and “indeterminate.”44 It is also 
a world where lawyers who know how to play the game well, and where so-
called “repeat players,” enjoy significant advantages.45 Under these 
circumstances, many Americans understandably believe lawyers have 
“unwarranted and unaccountable power in American society.” 46 
Put differently, the work of legal practitioners has become associated more 
with the manipulation of legal outcomes than with obtaining justice.47 Somewhat 
perversely, this is partly because mega-lawyering generates more opportunities 
for legal engagement. As more people invoke the law, Galanter argues, a sense 
that the law is “manipulable and political” becomes more widespread.48 It is this 
“catch-22” that led Galanter to conclude that mega-lawyering ultimately 
teaches us to feel “despair” about the possibilities for “legal vindication.”49 
Such despair is particularly problematic for cause lawyers, because they 
draw upon the perceived legitimacy of the law to advance the aims of their 
cause.50 As Scheingold argued in The Politics of Rights, “[i]nsofar as court 
decisions can legitimate claims and cue expectations,” the law can successfully 
contribute to political mobilization.51 Thus, when the legitimacy of the law is 
threatened, so is the political efficacy of cause lawyering. 
But is the picture really all that gloomy? As even Galanter notes, mega-
lawyering also creates important new opportunities for cause lawyers to re-
organize their efforts in ways that may increase their legal and political 
efficacy.52 From this point of view, mega-lawyering may pose no greater 
problems for the cause-lawyering enterprise than ordinary lawyering, which 
faces its own set of challenges.53 Is mega-lawyering really any more antithetical 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. at 172 (noting that the legal system in the United States “amplifies the powers of 
competent players of the law game, accentuating the advantages of those able to invest in continuous 
service, advance planning, long term strategy and large maneuvers”). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 172 (arguing that the American 
legal profession is a game that amplifies rewards to those—usually corporations—able to invest in long-
range planning while withholding such benefits from individuals). 
 48. Id. at 173. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See generally SCHEINGOLD, supra note 1, at 131–32, 162–63 (arguing that legal culture and 
rights help determine when people decide to turn to the government). 
 51. Id. at 132. Many subsequent studies have confirmed Scheingold’s claim. See, e.g., SUSAN M. 
OLSON, CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS (1984) (the role of 
law in the disability-rights movement); HELENA SILVERSTEIN, UNLEASHING RIGHTS: LAW, MEANING 
AND THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1996) (analyzing the role of law in the animal-rights 
movement); Neal Milner, The Dilemmas of Legal Mobilization: Ideologies and Strategies of Mental 
Patient Liberation, 8 LAW & POL’Y 105 (1986) (the role of law in mental-health activism). 
 52. See Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 170 (discussing attempts to put 
mega-law at the service of public interest and how mega-law creates long-run legal strategies for the 
new clientele). 
 53. See Scheingold & Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 236–44 (noting the 
challenges associated with cause lawyering in small-firm practice—a type of legal representation 
commonly associated with “ordinary” lawyering). 
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to justice than ordinary lawyering? And if so, is there something about ordinary 
lawyering that makes it better? One way to answer these questions is to 
compare the practice styles of those who lawyer for a cause. 
III 
TWO CASE STUDIES 
Over the last several decades, there has been a steady increase in attempts 
by foreign workers employed outside the United States by U.S.-based 
multinational employers to sue their employers in U.S. courts.54 These cases are 
politically significant because in each of the lawsuits filed, the foreign workers 
asserted that they had both the right to sue in the United States and the right to 
the same or similar employment-related protections as workers in the United 
States. Thus, the lawsuits presented an important opportunity for political 
mobilization around the issue of workers’ rights in the global economy.55  
Two of those cases are described below, with an emphasis on the 
background and practice style of the lawyers representing the workers. 
Although there are important differences in the way the cases were litigated, 
the legal and political challenges raised by the two cases were nearly identical. 
The lawsuits were brought in the state courts of the same state, at 
approximately the same time. And they raised the same legal issue: whether 
U.S. courts could or should hear the claims of foreign workers injured outside 
the United States. 
The workers in both cases were also represented by lawyers who, at least 
superficially, were more similar than different. In both instances, the litigation 
was handled by personal-injury lawyers who viewed the cases as opportunities 
to use the law as a tool for advancing a broader cause. However, the lawyers 
approached the litigation with different practice styles. In one case, the lawyers 
representing the workers had adopted a mega-lawyering practice style relatively 
recently. In the other, the lawyers employed more of an “ordinary” practice 
style. 
The cases illustrate how lawyers for a cause may adopt different practice 
styles, even when they are litigating very similar cases. The cases also show how 
differences in practice style may have some effect on the possibilities for 
 54. See Winston Anderson, Forum Non Conveniens Checkmated?—The Emergence of Retaliatory 
Legislation, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 183, 183–85 (2001) (discussing failed attempts by Indian and 
Caribbean workers to bring actions against American multinational corporations in U.S. courts); 
Malcom J. Rogge, Towards Transnational Corporate Accountability in the Global Economy: 
Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in In Re Union Carbide, Alfaro, Sequihua, and 
Aguinda, 36 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 299, 300 (2001) (noting that in recent years, plaintiffs from poor nations 
have attempted to bring class-action lawsuits in U.S. courts against transnational corporations). 
 55. In other areas of activism, such as the human-rights and environmental movements, litigation 
has played an important role in the development of transnational networks. See MARGARET E. KECK 
& KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS 24–25 (1998) (observing that diffuse interests have been permitted representation in 
American courts and that this explains why so many American advocacy groups devote substantial 
resources to litigation). 
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political mobilization in conjunction with the legal strategy. If these cases are 
any indication, cause lawyers who employ an “ordinary” practice style may be 
more, or at least equally, effective advocates for workers’ rights than “mega-
lawyers,” at least in the global or transnational context. 
A. The Stories 
Chavez v. Global Chemical Company56 was brought on behalf of several 
dozen Central American farmworkers who alleged that they had been left 
sterile by their workplace exposure to pesticides in Central America. The 
pesticides had been banned in the United States after farmworkers working in 
the United States complained of similar injuries. After winning a precedent-
setting ruling, which established the right of the workers to sue in the United 
States, the workers settled for an undisclosed amount said to be in the range of 
tens of millions of dollars. 
The case was handled by Allen & Adams, one of the nation’s largest and 
most successful personal-injury firms, with over seventy-five lawyers, a staff 
numbering in the hundreds, and offices in seven states. Both the size of the firm 
and the expansive geographic reach of its operations are consistent with a 
“mega-lawyering” style of practice.57 Like other firms operating with a mega-
lawyering style, Allen & Adams’s recruiting practices have become increasingly 
elite as it grew in size.58 Once comprised primarily of lawyers from local law 
schools, today the firm recruits from the most competitive law schools in the 
country. 
Although primarily oriented toward litigation for profit, Allen & Adams has 
a history of handling and funding cause litigation. Rick Allen, the founding and 
dominant shareholder of the firm, worked for a well-known political activist 
and philanthropist in his early years as a lawyer. Since opening his practice, he 
has provided substantial financial support to a variety of public-interest legal 
organizations. Allen has also served on the board of a number of activist 
groups. 
Firm insiders cite a variety of reasons for Allen & Adams’s taking the 
Chavez case, including that they thought it might be “a huge money-maker” 
and that it sounded “interesting and exotic.”59 At the same time, the firm also 
maintains that it brought the case because “it sounded like a case that really 
needed to be brought whether or not it was going to make any money.”60 
 56. Although the stories presented here are based on real cases, the dates, names, locations, and 
identifying details have been changed to protect the privacy of the parties involved. The information 
provided here was gathered from a variety of sources, including interviews with the lawyers, court files, 
media reports, and correspondence about the litigation, all of which is on file with the author. 
 57. See Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 154. 
 58. Id. at 158 (noting that “[m]ega-law draws recruits from higher social strata, from higher status 
ethnic groups, and from elite educational institutions”). 
 59. Interview with Counsel for the Plaintiffs, in Dallas, Tex. (Feb. 22, 2000). 
 60. Id. 
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After an initial investigation, Allen & Adams assigned primary 
responsibility for the case to Richard Wheeler, a first-year associate with almost 
no litigation experience. Prior to joining the firm, Wheeler had been a highly 
sought-after, top-ranked student at an elite law school. His initial involvement 
with the case had been as a summer associate and, though the opportunity to 
work more on the case was not a primary consideration in his decision to join 
the firm, he actively sought to be involved in the case after he became an 
associate. 
Wheeler said he was initially intrigued by the case because of the intellectual 
challenge it offered. As he explained, “[e]ven then, as a first-year lawyer, I 
could tell . . . [it was] cutting-edge stuff and interesting.”61 Wheeler also liked 
working on the case because of what he called the “political dimension” of the 
litigation.62 
The first challenge that Wheeler and his firm faced was to find a U.S. court 
that would agree to hear the lawsuit. Drawing upon its extensive resources 
around the country, Allen & Adams engaged in a strategy often referred to as 
“forum shopping.”63 The strategy entailed separating the workers into several 
different groups and bringing lawsuits on behalf of the different groups in 
different courts, the idea being that all the cases would be joined together once 
they found a court that agreed to hear the case. After two unsuccessful attempts 
to bring the lawsuit in two other states, Allen & Adams convinced a court to 
hear the case. 
The lawsuit named Global Chemical Company, as well as a large oil 
company, Universal Oil Corporation, as defendants. Although neither company 
had been involved in employing the workers, nor in exposing them to the 
chemical, both had been involved in the chemical’s manufacturing process and 
had allegedly agreed to its shipment for use overseas. The farmworkers’ 
employer was left out of the lawsuit. Ostensibly, this was because the workers 
feared that, if named as a defendant, the employer would retaliate against 
family members and workers who still worked on the plantation. It is likely, 
however, that legal strategy (that is, jurisdictional) considerations also played a 
part in this decision. 
Somewhat to the firm’s surprise, the case turned out to be extremely 
expensive to litigate. In addition to the trips to the workers’ home country, the 
firm had to pay for various experts on foreign law, plus the usual experts 
needed to prove the workers’ claims. In retrospect, it is also likely that Allen & 
Adams underestimated the legal challenges the case presented. As Wheeler 
explained, until they were in the middle of it, “[we] never imagined the 
procedural quagmire that it would become.”64 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 82–83 (1979) 
(describing forum shopping’s place in the American legal system). 
 64. Interview with Counsel for the Plaintiffs, in Dallas, Tex. (Feb. 22, 2000). 
  
Spring 2008] PRACTICE STYLE AND SUCCESSFUL LEGAL MOBILIZATION 11 
 
The firm’s leadership was well aware, however, of the political dimensions 
of the lawsuit. This awareness was facilitated in part by the legal support 
provided to the defendants by other corporations. Despite this recognition, the 
firm made virtually no attempt to generate support for their clients’ position 
among local activists or among others in the personal-injury bar who might 
have had a pecuniary interest in a ruling establishing the right of foreign 
workers to sue in the United States. When asked why this was so, Wheeler said 
that it did not “really click[] in his mind” to seek political support for his 
clients.65 
Wheeler also did not attempt to frame his arguments in a way that 
acknowledged the political dimensions of the case. Instead, his focus remained 
highly legalistic, even after the litigation became a subject of debate in the local 
legislature. To the surprise of many, the firm shunned its traditional allies in 
these legislative debates and agreed to engage in secret, closed-door 
negotiations that ultimately resulted in the legislative reversal of the workers’ 
legal victory. 
The second case, Espinoza v. Montego, was brought in the same state on 
behalf of the family of a foreign worker who was murdered while delivering 
payroll for a U.S. multinational corporation. The lawsuit focused on the 
company’s refusal to provide the worker with an armored truck, even though 
the roads in the area were known to be dangerous and frequented by thieves. 
After six days of trial, the employer agreed to an extraordinary settlement that 
included building a monument to workers’ rights and that paid more than $1 
million in damages. 
The Espinoza family was represented by the southwestern firm of Barrow & 
Burns. Brad Barrow, the lead partner of the firm, is a left-wing general 
practitioner who, prior to litigating the Espinoza case, had served on the local 
city council. Barrow’s partner, Mike Burns, is a self-described “hell-raiser” who 
speaks Spanish fluently and has traveled extensively outside the United States. 
Like Barrow, his politics are decidedly left of center.66 
At the time it litigated the Espinoza lawsuit, Barrow & Burns was typical of 
a law firm adopting an “ordinary” practice style. It had only a handful of 
lawyers and a relatively small support staff.67 Although well-regarded in their 
local community, the firm was relatively unknown elsewhere and had relatively 
little experience with major litigation.68 Its caseload included a variety of 
litigation matters, including personal-injury claims and commercial cases drawn 
almost exclusively from the local community. 
Both Barrow and Burns knew from the outset that the Espinoza case would 
be extremely difficult to litigate. Nevertheless, they were attracted to the 
 65. Id. 
 66. Interview with Counsel for the Plaintiff, in El Paso, Tex. (Sept. 13, 1998). 
 67. See Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 154 (noting that firms with an 
“ordinary” practice style tend to run on smaller organizational units). 
 68. See id. (associating “ordinary” lawyering with smaller cases and a “local” scope of operations). 
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litigation by the broader political issues at stake. As Burns put it, “this was the 
kind of case that I had gone to law school for.”69 
Knowing that they faced an uphill battle to even get the case to trial, Barrow 
& Burns recruited a nationally recognized legal expert, who usually represented 
corporate defendants, to handle the legal arguments. The expert’s arguments 
featured long lectures on the history and case law of technical legal issues, 
reflecting extensive research. In short, unlike Barrow & Burns, the legal expert 
they recruited operated with a “mega-lawyering” practice style.70 
Barrow & Burns, meanwhile, spent significant energy getting to know their 
clients—the family of the murdered worker—and understanding what they 
hoped to achieve with the litigation. During the course of the lawsuit, Barrow & 
Burns developed a deep emotional connection with the family. During 
interviews with the lawyers several years after the case was litigated, they 
showed a video that featured photos of the worker before her murder and cried 
when talking about the case.71 
Barrow & Burns also worked to obtain political support for the lawsuit from 
activists in the United States. To some extent, this was a matter of simply calling 
upon old friends. Despite their extensive personal contacts, however, they did 
not take this support for granted. To convince activists to become involved, 
Barrow & Burns wrote lengthy letters to several activist organizations, urging 
them to get involved in the case. In most instances, it was this contact that 
pushed the activists to become involved. 
Once activists agreed to support the case, Barrow & Burns also gave them 
substantive roles in the litigation. One activist, for example, helped to recruit 
and prepare witnesses for trial. Others tracked media coverage and kept 
copious notes during the trial. As a measure of how much Barrow & Burns 
valued this input, both attorneys later described the activists’ support as 
“absolutely critical” to the success of the case.72 
This broader, more political perspective on the case also influenced Barrow 
& Burns’s strategy at trial, where Barrow placed great emphasis on the broader 
issue of the working conditions of workers overseas. During his questioning of 
the defendants, for example, Barrow repeatedly asked whether the defendants 
valued the lives of their workers in the United States more than the lives of 
other workers. He also questioned them about their refusal to raise wages, 
despite strikes and walkouts for higher wages. 
After six days of trial, the defendants approached Barrow & Burns and 
asked them what it would take to settle. Barrow & Burns described the 
subsequent negotiations as an “extraordinary experience,” in which the 
 69. Interview with Counsel for the Plaintiff, in El Paso, Tex. (Sept. 13, 1998). 
 70. See infra text accompanying note 74. 
 71. Interview with Counsel for the Plaintiff, in El Paso, Tex. (Sept. 13, 1998). 
 72. Id. 
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defendants readily agreed to virtually all of their terms, including building a 
monument to the slain worker.73  
B. “Mega-lawyering” v. “Ordinary” Lawyering 
In some respects, the experiences of the workers’ lawyers in these two cases 
were quite similar. For each of the lawyers, the litigation represented an 
important moment in their careers when they were motivated by the 
opportunity the litigation presented to engage in cutting-edge, challenging, and 
politically significant legal work. Thus, each clearly understood that taking on 
the cases involved lawyering for a cause. At the same time, however, the 
lawyers employed very different practice styles. 
Richard Wheeler of Allen & Adams approached the Chavez case with a 
style of practice that most closely resembles mega-lawyering. “Mega-
lawyering,” recall, features intense specialization and coordination. In contrast 
to “ordinary” lawyering, it involves “meticulous and exhaustive research, 
painstaking assembly of data, and generous use of experts.”74 As a large law 
firm, Allen & Adams employs these techniques in their everyday cases. Not 
surprisingly, Wheeler and the firm employed a similar approach in the course of 
litigating the Chavez case. From Allen & Adams’s own reports and from 
reviewing the pleadings filed in the lawsuit, it is clear that the firm expended a 
great deal of energy on legal research and factual investigation. It also spent a 
great deal of money on experts for the case. These features characterize the 
practice style as mega-lawyering in the cause-lawyering context. 
At first glance, this characterization of Wheeler’s practice style may seem 
somewhat unexpected. Allen & Adams is a personal-injury law firm, and most 
personal-injury law firms are small firms, associated with an ordinary practice 
style that places less emphasis on legal research and investigation.75 On the 
other hand, with more than seventy-five lawyers and recruiting practices that 
favor making new hires from only the top ranks of highly rated law schools, 
Allen & Adams looks and operates much like an elite firm in corporate 
practice.76 Under these circumstances, it makes sense that their lawyers would 
approach litigation with a mega-lawyering style. 
In contrast, Barrow & Burns, the lead lawyers for the Espinoza family, 
exhibited a practice style that more closely resembles “ordinary” lawyering, 
which “involves little consultation or legal learning, more perfunctory 
investigation and a fair amount of ‘winging it.’”77 Barrow & Burns were small-
firm lawyers who paid relatively little attention to the legal research that the 
case required. Instead, they hired someone else—a corporate defense lawyer 
with highly specialized legal expertise—to research and argue the key legal 
 73. Id. 
 74. Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 157. 
 75. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
 76. See supra text accompanying note 58. 
 77. See Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 157. 
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issues for them. And, unlike Allen & Adams, Barrow & Burns relied on 
assistance from the activist community in identifying and preparing their expert 
witnesses. In short, Barrow & Burns’s style of practice represents the antithesis 
of the mega-lawyering approach, if not a pure embrace of the “ordinary” 
lawyering style of “winging it.” 
Barrow & Burns also engaged more with local activists throughout the 
litigation and otherwise capitalized on the political opportunities the litigation 
presented. More so than Allen & Adams, Barrow & Burns encouraged activist 
involvement and worked with activists throughout the litigation to maximize 
the political impact of the case. This was done in part by framing their legal 
arguments in terms of the broader issue of workers’ rights and by structuring 
the settlement along lines that recognized the broader cause at stake. The 
mega-lawyering practitioners at Allen & Adams, in contrast, made virtually no 
effort to either notify activists of the litigation or involve them in litigation 
strategy. 
Is the Espinoza case an anomaly, or are there reasons why lawyers with an 
ordinary practice style might be more effective at identifying and capitalizing on 
the political opportunities in this type of litigation? One possibility is that the 
relatively less legalistic approach of the ordinary practice style may allow 
lawyers to take a more pragmatic and, ultimately, more political approach to 
framing the arguments in the case. During the Espinoza trial, for example, 
Barrow & Burns made multiple arguments about the low wages and poor 
working conditions of other foreign workers. From a legal standpoint, these 
issues had no place in the litigation because general working conditions were 
not on trial. But from a political perspective, it was quite astute for these 
arguments to be made, and Barrow & Burns did not hesitate to “wing it” and 
make them. 
Barrow & Burns also took a very pragmatic and political, as opposed to 
legalistic, approach to settlement. Had a judge or a jury decided the case, the 
family would have been limited to the recovery of monetary damages because 
the claims only involved personal injury.78 Instead of feeling confined by these 
limitations, Barrow & Burns asked for, and received in settlement, concessions 
that a court of law would not have been able to award, such as a statue for the 
workers and a scholarship fund, in addition to monetary compensation for their 
clients. The lead lawyer in the Chavez case, in contrast, took a highly legalistic 
approach to the case. In the lawyer’s words, it simply “never occurred” to him 
to litigate the case in any other way.79 Because of this, he did not reach out to 
activists, even though he was politically attuned to the broader political 
dimension of the case. 
 78. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 377 (2000) (noting that in personal-injury cases, 
“the normal remedy is compensatory damages”). 
 79. Interview with Counsel for the Plaintiffs, in Dallas, Tex. (Feb. 22, 2000). 
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There is no evidence, however, that “ordinary” lawyers are more committed 
to the cause than mega-lawyers. On the contrary, there is some evidence that 
the lawyers for the Espinoza family were less committed than the lawyers at 
Allen & Adams. The lead lawyer for the Chavez workers is still handling 
lawsuits on behalf of foreign workers. Barrow & Burns, in contrast, has not 
handled any foreign workers’ cases since Espinoza and expresses relative 
indifference about accepting such cases in the future.80 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
These case studies suggest that the making of a great cause lawyer depends, 
in part, on practice style. Put differently, how a lawyer approaches legal practice 
seems to matter for purposes of legal mobilization. In these cases, cause lawyers 
were more effective at using the law to advance a political agenda when they 
adopted a more flexible practice style that may more closely resemble that of an 
“ordinary” lawyer. 
Perhaps more important, as Galanter predicted, the mega-lawyering 
strategies of the Chavez lawyers ultimately conveyed a message of despair: 
although the workers won an important legal ruling, the victory was overturned 
by a state legislature, and many view the case as a failed opportunity to advance 
the broader cause of workers’ rights. Espinoza, on the other hand, nourishes 
our fondest hopes about the possibilities for legal mobilization. It was, as Burns 
described it, “the kind of case that [he] had gone to law school for.”81 
That “ordinary” lawyering could rejuvenate our faith in the law seems 
almost counter-intuitive. But this hypothesis would also seem to be at the heart 
of a legal movement spearheaded by trial lawyer Gerry Spence (whose fame 
grew exponentially when he served as a television commentator during the O.J. 
Simpson trial). In The Making of a Country Lawyer, Spence chronicles his 
personal path, which culminated in the moment when he decided to stop 
representing established interests and start representing individuals.82 For 
Spence, this move was not simply about representing a different type of client; it 
was also about adopting a different practice style. 
Although Spence uses different language, the practice style of a “country 
lawyer” has much in common with the “ordinary” practice style described by 
Galanter. For Spence, winning a case is less about intensive research—
characteristic of mega-lawyering—and more about developing an emotional 
connection with the client.83 Spence and the many lawyers who follow his 
 80. Interview with Counsel for the Plaintiff, in El Paso, Tex. (Sept. 13, 1998). 
 81. Id. 
 82. GERRY SPENCE, THE MAKING OF A COUNTRY LAWYER (1996). 
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principles84 believe that a return to “country” lawyering is as much about 
reclaiming a lawyer’s role in advocating for justice as it is about winning cases.85 
According to Spence, “the principal reason people hold lawyers in such 
disdain” is that lawyers have failed to “hear” the “anguish of a people seeking 
justice.”86 At his trial lawyer college, small-firm lawyers with very limited 
resources learn to listen to their clients and, in doing so, to free themselves from 
the limitations of their legal education and become true “warriors” for 
“justice.”87 
There was something of Spence’s philosophy in Barrow & Burns’s approach 
to the Espinoza litigation. Although not all lawyers employing an “ordinary” 
practice style embrace Spence’s techniques, Barrow & Burns’s relationship with 
the Espinoza family suggested a very high degree of client identification. Both 
Barrow & Burns exhibited a great deal of compassion for the Espinoza family 
and their fate. As compared to the other lawyers, for example, Barrow & Burns 
were more eager to share details about Espinoza’s life. Perhaps more telling, in 
the course of the interviews that took place several years after the case’s 
conclusion, both Barrow and Burns wiped away tears while discussing the case.88 
From this perspective, the distinction that Galanter drew between mega-
lawyering and “ordinary” lawyering reveals itself as much more than simply a 
useful construct for understanding a rapidly changing profession; it is also a 
window into how our faith in the law is also undergoing change, both within and 
outside the profession. 
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